Chad has reestablished military cooperation with France nearly 18 months after ordering the withdrawal of French forces during a dispute over intelligence-sharing in the Lake Chad Basin.
French troops returned to Chad in April under a new arrangement focused on military training, intelligence support and limited operational deployments. The renewed partnership is intended to strengthen Chad’s capacity to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad region, while also addressing security concerns along its eastern border with Sudan.
Unlike previous defence arrangements, the new agreement does not include the establishment of permanent French military bases in Chad.
Security analyst Hassan Yusuf Zarma said the renewed cooperation reflects a shared desire by both countries to maintain security ties while adapting to the political changes that have reshaped France’s relationship with several Sahel nations.
Analyst Aleksander Olech described the agreement as a more cautious approach by France.
“France is trying to rebuild military cooperation with Chad, but not in the old format. This is not a full French comeback in Chad. It is a cautious attempt to return through the side door, with fewer soldiers, less visibility and more dependence on Chadian political consent,” he said.
Chad expelled approximately 1,000 French troops in January 2025 amid growing anti-French sentiment across the Sahel, bringing to an end more than six decades of continuous French military presence in the country.
Although French forces withdrew, French officials maintained at the time that military cooperation between the two countries would continue in a different form.
Following France’s departure, Chad sought security partnerships with Russia, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, reports indicate that those relationships encountered significant challenges.
According to analysts, the poor performance of Russia’s Africa Corps in combating insurgents in Mali discouraged Chad from deepening military ties with Moscow. Meanwhile, Turkish-made ANKA-S and Aksungur attack drones reportedly proved too costly for Chad to operate and maintain.
The UAE also became a less attractive security partner following allegations that it supported Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through an airport located in Chad. The UAE has consistently denied the allegations.
Military analysts believe France’s immediate contribution will focus on strengthening Chad’s air capabilities.
Since the withdrawal of French forces, Chad has reportedly faced difficulties with rapid medical evacuations, aerial support for ground operations and intelligence gathering—areas previously supported by France.
In addition to training programmes, joint military exercises and intelligence cooperation, both countries are also discussing the possible acquisition of French helicopters and military aircraft by the Chadian armed forces.
The revised defence agreement could also allow France to conduct limited air operations from the former Sergeant Adji Kosseï military base in N’Djamena, which was handed over to Chad following France’s 2025 withdrawal.
Analysts say such an arrangement would provide France with a strategic operational foothold in Central Africa without returning to the large, permanent military base model that became increasingly unpopular across the Sahel.
