Over three years, the U.S. Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Affairs program — working quietly alongside the Nigeria Police Force — built something that Nigerians are now desperately fighting to preserve. The record is documented, and the numbers are striking.
Personnel Trained:
- 169 SIS Rank and File officers completed the INL-sponsored eight-week training course at the Police Mobile Force Training College in Ende Hills, Nasarawa State
- 200 additional officers were expected to complete training in subsequent months
- 50 SIS commanders — leading units deployed across multiple states — had already been trained before that graduation ceremony
- Over 400 total personnel trained across four critical units: the Complaint Response Unit (CRU), Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU), Mobile Police Unit (MOPOL), and Special Intervention Squad (SIS)
Documented Operational Results:
- 139 kidnapping and armed robbery suspects arrested
- 154 kidnapped victims rescued unharmed
- 3 major suppliers of arms and ammunition to bandits in Niger, Zamfara, and Kaduna States intercepted along the Abuja-Kaduna expressway — cutting off a weapons pipeline into some of Nigeria’s most volatile territory
- 3 armed bandits neutralized on January 26, 2024, including their gang leader, in a direct SIS confrontation
- 8 Eastern Security Network (ESN) terrorists neutralized in Owerri, Imo State, on August 1, 2024
- 20 kidnapped individuals rescued in a single operation on September 14, 2024
- 16 notorious criminals apprehended and a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) recovered in the unit’s earliest days of operations
Legal and Diplomatic Foundation:
- A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the U.S. Embassy and the Inspector-General of Police on December 18, 2023, specifically to support the SIS in enhancing law enforcement capabilities — particularly in the northeast region — while fostering a culture of accountability within the NPF
- 10 pilot states identified as SIS deployment zones, all of them classified as high-risk
These are not informal arrangements. They are treaty-level commitments bearing real, life-saving results. And they are all scheduled to expire on March 31, 2026.
To understand what is at stake, you have to understand where the SIS came from.
The squad was launched in Jos, Plateau State, on December 29, 2023 — just five days after armed bandits attacked the Christian-majority communities of Mangu, Bokkos, and Barkin Ladi Local Government Areas on Christmas Eve, killing over 200 civilians and destroying widespread property. The SIS was not conceived in a boardroom. It was born from grief, from the demand of a shattered community for a security force capable of protecting them.
What the INL program delivers that nothing else can:
- Elite tactical training — including Public Order Management, Police Tactics, Firearms Training, and Use of Force
- Simultaneous grounding in Human Rights, Verbal De-escalation, and Community Policing — a combination that is rare in any security environment, let alone Nigeria’s
- Medical First Responder Training and Leadership Development that elevate the entire operational culture of the units involved
- Train-the-Trainer modules that allow the institutional knowledge to cascade downward even after American trainers depart
Strip away that training, and one of two outcomes becomes likely: a unit that slowly loses its tactical sharpness as doctrine drifts without reinforcement, or a unit that retains its aggression but loses its accountability. Neither outcome serves ordinary Nigerians.
Communities most at risk if the program expires:
- Plateau State — birthplace of the SIS and ground zero for Christmas Eve 2023 massacres
- Benue State — among the most consistently targeted by herdsmen-farmer violence
- Kaduna State — a recurring flashpoint for both ethno-religious conflict and banditry
- The broader Middle Belt corridor — where the line between criminality and terrorism has effectively dissolved
Those ten pilot deployment states do not become less dangerous on April 1. If the program ends and violence fills the vacuum, the message received on the ground will not be diplomatic. It will be visceral: America came, built something, and walked away.
Everything the public record reveals about Acting Inspector-General of Police Tunji Disu points to a commander made for this moment — and one who will need the SIS to be at its sharpest.
Disu’s operational biography:
- 34 years of continuous service in the Nigeria Police Force across operational, investigative, and administrative roles
- Former Commanding Officer of SARS and anti-kidnapping units across Rivers, Ondo, and Oyo States
- Commander of the Lagos State Rapid Response Squad from 2015 to 2021 — famously rebranding his officers as “The Good Guys,” a citizen-focused initiative widely praised for professionalism and community engagement
- Former head of the Intelligence Response Team of the Nigeria Police Force — one of the NPF’s most demanding operational postings
- Led the first Nigerian Police contingent to the African Union Mission in Sudan in 2005, serving as Acting Chief of Staff during Darfur peacekeeping operations — a level of multinational security coordination experience that is rare among Nigerian police commanders
On assuming office, Disu declared that his tenure would be built on three pillars: professionalism, modernism, and accountability. That is essentially a restatement of what the INL curriculum has spent three years delivering to SIS officers.
Why this alignment matters:
- Disu’s instinct, by every available account, is to take the fight directly to the enemy rather than manage threats from a distance
- The SIS was designed to be exactly that — the IGP’s premier rapid-response instrument, deployable to wherever the security situation demands
- A commander with Disu’s operational biography will demand a unit that is tactically sharp, legally accountable, and culturally trusted by the communities it serves — all three of which the INL program has spent three years building
Cutting the program now, at precisely the moment a new IGP with an overtly operational mandate assumes command, would be the equivalent of handing a commander a precision instrument and simultaneously denying him the maintenance it requires to function.
When approximately 100 U.S. military advisers touched down at Bauchi Airfield on February 16, 2026, the world took notice. What the world did not notice is that on the same timeline, the people who know Nigeria best are being quietly shown the door.
What the INL team carries that cannot be downloaded or briefed:
- Three years of embedded knowledge of NPF officers — who they trained, what those officers can do, and which units are genuinely ready for advanced operations
- Direct relationships with local commanders across multiple states — relationships built through shared meals, shared risks, and shared missions
- Deep familiarity with the cultural, ethnic, religious, and political sensitivities that determine whether a security operation succeeds or collapses in any given Nigerian community
- Firsthand understanding of the command dynamics and inter-agency friction points that shape how Nigerian security forces actually operate in the field
Three compounding risks if the knowledge transfer does not happen:
Risk One — Loss of irreplaceable human terrain intelligence. Any experienced military commander will say the same thing: intelligence about the human terrain is as critical as intelligence about the enemy. The INL team is that intelligence, embodied in people who have lived it. No newly arrived military adviser can absorb from a briefing document what these trainers have built over three years on the ground.
Risk Two — A permanent seam between police and military capacity-building. The Counter Terrorism Unit trained by INL overlaps directly in mission with what AFRICOM advisers are now supporting alongside the Nigerian Army. The SIS operates in exactly the grey zone between policing and military operations that characterizes Nigeria’s most contested conflict zones. With $413 million committed to AFRICOM operations in Nigeria, allowing these two programs to exist in parallel without a coordination bridge — and then eliminating the one program best positioned to build that bridge — is a strategic contradiction that will cost lives.
Risk Three — The NPF-Nigerian Army relationship. This is the most underappreciated risk of all. The relationship between the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Army has historically been tense, marked by jurisdictional rivalry and institutional mistrust. The INL trainers, having spent three years embedded on the police side of that divide, are uniquely positioned to help mediate the interface as U.S. military advisers begin coordinating with the Army. Their departure removes a natural bridge-builder from one of the most consequential institutional relationships in Nigeria’s internal security architecture — at precisely the moment when coherent coordination has never mattered more.
Nigerian communities are not naive about Washington’s internal politics. They understand that program renewals require political will, budgetary justification, and interagency coordination. They are making that case through every available channel, and they are right to do so.
The ask, plainly stated:
- Extend the INL SIS training program beyond March 31, 2026
- Double its scope if possible, to reach the Nigerian police units still awaiting training
- Integrate it with the new AFRICOM military training mission wherever coordination can achieve results
- Allow the INL team to conduct a structured knowledge transfer to newly arrived U.S. military advisers before any departure is authorized
The United States has demonstrated, through its Christmas Day airstrikes in Sokoto, its AFRICOM deployment to Bauchi, and its $413 million security commitment, that it is willing to invest in Nigeria’s stability at scale. The only thing left is to invest wisely.
And wisdom, in this case, means not cutting the roots while you are still trying to grow the tree.
March 31 is not a deadline. It is a choice. Right now, Nigerians — and American strategic interests — are both pleading for Washington to make the right one.
Correspondents reached out to trainers currently involved in the INL program for comment. They declined, noting they are not authorized to speak on behalf of the U.S. government.
